If certainty is an estimate of possible outcomes or states, what is the catalyst between holding a certainty and deciding on it? If "certainty" delineates the differences in outcomes of a given action/thought/belief, then in situations where two or more possible outcomes are equally as certain (or equally preferable), we run into difficulties. Can we declare certainty that something is uncertain? (the truth is that there is no truth?) I think we can fault your theory on its own merits, as it self negates in situations of equal probability in the outcome of the set. Given that "certainty" describes a situation of probable outcomes between two or more things/situation/etc, declaring uncertainty as a certainty is a process of self-negation in the set if the two results are mutually exclusive. In a sense, this is declaring an equivocation. How can we be certain that the equivocation itself is warranted, necessary, required, or even certain? How can we be certain that the factors allowing for equivocation are, in fact, equivocal? There must be something that pushes an individual to declare certainty in favour of one outcome versus another, even if that certainty is decided to be the uncertain. Consider Pascal's Wager. The Wager is set up on a basic set of four possible outcomes from two choices. But in reality we have three basic options: Theism; Atheism; Agnosticism/Fence-Sitting. If we allow that all other hair-splitting definitions fall basically into these three outcomes (god exists, god doesn't exist, there is no answer), and we use the method of determining certainty you describe, we're left with: God Exists = God Does Not Exist = There Is No Answer. The outcome set is entirely equivocal. But that's not (normally) an acceptable "certainty." Certitude would require that one answer/outcome/situation be declared victor. So if this set is "true," then the actual answer to Pascal's Wager is to choose "There Is No Answer" because it holds both "God Exists" and "God Does Not Exist" to be true, simultaneously, and thereby takes full advantage of all possible outcomes of either set. Yet, these "certainties" (theism/atheism) are mutually exclusive. In any case, the underlying question is: what, in a situation of equal/equivocal "certainties," acts as catalyst for the declaration of a primary certainty? What allows for the decision of certainty?